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The Unpalatable Position Of The Law In Nigeria
By Ekom Nwoko
Political Parties are established under Section 221 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) hereinafter referred to as (CFRN). Section 223 of CFRN provides for constitution and Rules of political parties. The constitution and rules of political parties derive the validity from section 223 of the CFRN. The political parties are guided by the CFRN, Electoral Act 2022, Constitution of the Political Parties, Electoral Guidelines issued by the Parties, etc.
QUALIFICATION OF ASPIRANTS
Section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act 2022 provides that a political party cannot impose any condition outside what is provided in the Constitution as a ground for disqualification of any aspirant. Section 84 (3) expressly states, Qualifications of Aspirants and Candidates “(3) A political party shall not impose nomination qualification or disqualification criteria, measures, or conditions on any aspirant or candidate for any election in its constitution, guidelines, or rules for nomination of candidates for elections, except as prescribed under section 65, 66, 106, 107, 131, 177 and 187 of the constitution”. The section gives powers to a political party to disqualify an aspirant when it becomes necessary and in line with the law.
POLITICAL PARTY CAN DISQUALIFY BASED ON CERTIFICATE RELATED ISSUES
The political parties in Nigeria have learnt painful lessons since the inception of the present democratic experience in Nigeria commenced in 1999. The parties have suffered electoral and judicial defeats owing to presenting candidates who have issues in their certificates. The first painful experience was the case of Mr. Salisu Buhari, the first Speaker of the House of Representatives produced by Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in June 1999. Salisu Buhari resigned as the Speaker and was convicted by the court but was later pardoned by the Government of that time. It was a huge embarrassment to PDP.
The All Progressive Congress (APC) has also suffered a very annoying embarrassment and huge loss in the Governorship race and quest in Bayelsa State. The APC lost Bayelsa State Governorship on grounds of certificate paraded or presented by the Deputy Governorship Candidate of APC. Read the full gist in Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) v Degi-Eremienyo (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1781) 274. This is one victory the APC worked so hard to secure but lost it on grounds of wrong credentials.
So it is wise for political parties to properly screen their aspirants’ credentials to avoid any embarrassment and eventual loss of position to opposition parties in court.
POLITICAL PARTY CAN DISQUALIFY BASED ON ZONING OF POLITICAL OFFICES
The party can follow, honour and abide by the zoning of the party. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in recognition of the significance of zoning of political offices enshrined in Article 7 (2) of its Constitution thus; “In pursuance of the principle of equity, justice and fairness, the party shall adhere to the policy of rotation and zoning of party and public elective offices and shall be enforced by the appropriate Executive Committee”
Section 2 of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2017 (as amended) provides for the Supremacy of the PDP Constitution on members of the Party. For avoidance of doubt, we reproduce it for ease of reference, Section 2 of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2017 (as amended) provides, “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and any other law in force, this Constitution shall be supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all members and organs of the party”. The All progressive Congress (APC) also has a similar provision in its constitution. Article 2 of the All progressive Congress (APC) 2014 provides,
“Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the provisions of this Constitution shall be supreme PROVIDED that where any Rule, Regulation or any other enactment of the Party is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, such a Rule, Regulation and Enactment shall, to the extent of its inconsistency, be null and void and of not effect whatsoever”.
1.10 The political parties may have gotten their powers on zoning from the Section 14 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). For good order sake and for avoidance of doubt as well as deeper appreciation, it is germane to reproduce the provision as follows, “(1) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State base on the principles of democracy and social justice. (2) it is hereby, accordingly, declared that-(a) sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives all its powers and authority; (b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government; and (c) the participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
(3) The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.
(4) The composition of the Government of a State, a Local Government Council, or any of the agencies of such Government or Council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognize and the conduct of the affairs of the Government or Council the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the Federation. This is where political parties derived their powers to decide on zoning of political offices and enforcement of the zoning by political parties.
PARTY PRIMARIES AND NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES AS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The political party is supreme over its own affairs. It is our submission that a political party is supreme over its own affairs, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to question the exercise of its discretion, one way or the other. We reiterate that one basic rationale behind this principle of law is that since persons have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules and regulations of a political party, they should be left alone to be governed by such rules and regulations. This position of law is again emphasized in the case of APC V MOSES (2021) 14 NWLR (PT. 1796) 276 at 320, paras. C – F, Augie JSC held, “The cross appellants, who instituted the said suit at the trial court, filed a notice of cross-appeal challenging that part of the decision of the Court of Appeal where it determined the merits of the appeal before it, after striking out the appeal for want of jurisdiction”.
However, the decision of this court in the substantive appeal, have reverberating effects, one of which is that this cross-appeal has no legs to stand on, because the suit filled at the trial court, is not a pre-election matter. It touches on the domestic or internal affairs of a political party, which is within the exclusive province of the party. In other words, a political party is supreme over its own affairs, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to question the exercise of its discretion, one way or the other – see Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310, wherein this court per Tobi, J.S.C, explained that:
One basic rationale behind this principle of law is that since persons have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules and regulations of a political Party, they should be left alone to be governed by such rules and regulations. Once persons have freely mortgaged their consciences to a situation, Courts of law should not interfere.
We submit that Court’s jurisdiction is ousted in matters dealing with internal affairs or resolution of a political party regarding nomination or leadership of political parties. In the case of APC v Moses (supra) at 321, paras. A-E, Augie JSC held, “Members of a party would do well to understand and appreciate the finality of a party’s decision over its domestic or internal affairs. The court would only interfere where the party has violated its own rules.
In this case, the focus is on the Guidelines issued by a political party regarding congress to fill executive internal leadership positions, and it is settled that the issue of leadership and/or membership of a political party, is an internal or domestic affair of the party, which is “within the political party’s jurisdiction and is indeed No-Go area for courts, as they lack jurisdiction to delve into such affairs or matters. The court’s jurisdiction is ousted, because such matter is non-justiciable” – see Ufomba v. INEC (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1582) 175 SC. “Justiciable”, means a case or dispute properly brought before a court of justice capable of being disposed of properly – Ufomba v. INEC (supra). When a matter is “non-justiciable”, it means that a court cannot hear it. The court has no jurisdiction to look into it Onuoha v. Okafor (supra), P.D.P. v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85.
The subject matter of this cross-appeal is non-justiciable, and the end result is that the cross-appeal be and is hereby struck out. The parties in the main and cross appeal shall bear their own costs”. In the concurring Judgment of Jauro JSC at page 323 paras B – F, His Lordship held,
This can only be done if the said section is amended but until then, every judicial interpretation of the term pre-election matter ought to be considered within the parameters of section 285(14) of the Constitution (supra).
This court does not have the jurisdictional competence to venture into the determination of the suit culminating into the cross-appeal. The cross cross-appeal filed by the respondents/cross appellants is centered on issues bordering on operations of the domestic and internal affairs of the political party which is within the control of the party. This court in a legion of judicial authorities, has reiterated its stance on the non-justiciability of actions predicated on conduct of domestic and internal affairs of political parties. This court, per Sanusi, J.S.C. in the case of Ufomba v. INEC & ORS. (2017) LPELR-42079 (SC); (2017) NWLR (Pt. 1582) … held that:
“The issue now is, are claims against the nomination of members or leaders of the political party justifiable? My simple answer to that question is a capital “No”. The law is trite that courts jurisdiction is ousted in matters dealing with internal affairs or resolution of a political party regarding nomination or leadership of that political party as in this instant case.”
In conclusion, by reason of the above and of course the detailed reasons contained in the lead judgment of my learned brother, just delivered, I too, hold that the appeal has merit and same is hereby allowed. On the other hand, the cross-appeal is hereby struck out”. We submit that a political party, being a voluntary organization or association, disputes over its internal affairs is non-justiciable and a court has no jurisdiction to entertain them, unless such power is expressly conferred on it by statute or the commission of a crime is imputed, or there is a claim for damages for breach of the personal contractual right of a person. The practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unincorporated associations) for the members. It leaves the members to run their association. ONUOHA V. OKAFOR (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; AMAECHI V INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1040) 504; ABDULKADIR V MAMMAN (2003) 14 NWLR (PT. 1040) 1 REFERRED TO.] (PP. 325-326, PARAS. H-B). In APC V MOSES (2021) 14 NWLR (PT. 1796) 276 AT 325 – 326, PARAS. F – B, Agim, JSC held,
“The decision of this court in APC v. Umar (Supra) is not applicable to this case because the relevant facts of that case are different from the relevant facts in this case. The relevant facts in Umar’s case is that the action challenged the ward congresses to produce electors in an impending primary election, which primary election held during the pendency of the action. In our instant case, the relevant facts are that the members of the party who paid for nomination forms to participate in the May 5, 2018 Ward congresses have the exclusive right to participate in future ward congresses and no other party member should be sold forms for participation in such future Ward Congress.
For the above reasons and the more detailed ones in the lead judgment, I also allow this appeal as meritorious. Cross-Appeal. I also agree with the reasoning, conclusion and orders in the lead Judgment concerning the cross-appeal. The general law is that a political party, being a voluntary organization or association, disputes over its internal affairs are non-justiciable and a court has no jurisdiction to entertain them. Unless such power is expressly conferred on it by statute or the commission of a crime is imputed or there is a claim for damages for breach of the personal contractual right of a person. As held by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244 at 254 “the practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unincorporated associations) for the members. It leaves the members to run their association”. The Court further held per Aniagolu, J.S.C. thus “the issues raised on whether the various internal committee proceedings of the party were regularly conducted and whether there was lapse in the observance of the rules of natural justice are issues which the court will god into after it has decided that the matter is one in respect of which it will exercise jurisdiction”.
We submit that the practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unincorporated associations) for members. The principle underlying this law is that voluntary associations or organizations are internally run by majority of the members and that, therefore, disputes which arise within them must be resolved by the majority decision of their members. We refer to APC V MOSES (SUPRA) AT 326, PARAS. G-H. “The practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unincorporations) for members. The brief of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd respondents put the matter very succinctly at p. 11 of the brief of when it states that the position of the law is that disputes which arise must be resolved by a majority decision of the members. This is the so called majority rule otherwise known as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, the decision in which was first articulated…”
At page 327, Paras. C-D, the court held, “The principle underlying this law is that voluntary associations or organizations are internally run by majority of the members and that therefore disputes which arise within them must be resolved by the majority decision of their members. This principle commonly known as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle was restated by the Supreme Court in Abubakar & Ors v. Smith &Ors (1973) 6 SC 31 by adopting the statement of Mellish L.J. in McDonghall v. Gardiner (1875( CH.D 13 at 15 – 26…”
We submit that a political party is like a club, a voluntary association. It has its rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution. Members join of their free will. By joining, they have freely given their consent to be bound by its rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution. These rules must be obeyed by all members of the party, as the party’s decision is final over its own affairs. We refer to APC V MOSES (SUPRA) at 320-321, PARAS. C – D, the Court held,
“However, the decision of this court in the substantive appeal, has reverberating effects, one of which is that this cross-appeal has no legs to stand on, because the suit filed at the trial court, is not a pre-election matter. It touches on the domestic or internal affairs of a political party, which is within the exclusive province of the party. In other words, a political party is supreme over its own affairs, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to question the exercise of its discretion, one way or the other – see Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310, wherein this Court per Tobi, J.S.C, explained that:
One basic rationale behind this principle of law is that since persons have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules and regulation of a political party, they should be left alone to be governed by such rules and regulations. Once person have freely mortgaged their consciences to a situation, Courts of law should not interfere. See also Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 14 NSCC 494 and Agi v. P.D.P. (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386, wherein Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C, observed that:
A party is like a club, a voluntary association. It has its rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution. Members join of their own free will. By joining, they have freely given their consent to be bound by [its] rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution – – These rules – – must be obeyed by all members of the party, as the party’s decision is final over its own affairs. Members of a party would do well to understand and appreciate the finality of a party’s decision over its domestic or internal affairs. The Court would only interfere where the party has violated its own rules.
In this case, the focus is on the Guidelines issued by a political party regarding congresses to fill executive internal leadership positions, and it is settled that the issue of leadership and/or membership of a political party, is an internal or domestic affair of the party, which is “within the political party’s jurisdiction and is indeed No-Go area for courts, as they lack jurisdiction to delve into such affairs or matters. The Court’s jurisdiction is ousted, because such subject matter is non-justiciable” – see Ufomba v. INEC (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1582) 175 SC”.
We submit that members of a political party would do well to understand and appreciate the finality of a party’s decision over its domestic or internal affairs. The court would only interfere where the party has violated its own rules. The issue of leadership and/or membership of a political party, is an internal or domestic affairs of the party, which is within the political party’s Jurisdiction and is indeed “No-Go” area for courts, as they lack jurisdiction to delve into such affairs or matters. The court’s jurisdiction is ousted, because such subject matter is non-justiciable. We submit that a member of a voluntary organization cannot sue for breach of the internal Constitution and regulations of the organization in the internal affairs of the organization. The doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the internal affairs of a voluntary association of individuals. In APC v Moses (supra) at 328, paras. B-E, the Court held:
“The doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the internal affairs of a voluntary association. So the decision of the National Working Committee of the Appellant to hold Ward congresses for general purposes in Rivers State in future cannot be challenged in court as being contrary to the Appellant’s constitution or on any ground. As held by Lord Denning in Institution of mechanical Engineers v. Cane (1961) A.C. 696 at 724 the doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the internal affairs of a voluntary association of individuals. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) and P.D.P. v. Sylva (supra) and by the Court of Appeal in Abdulkadir & Anor v. Mammon &Ors. It is emphasized in all these decisions that a member of a voluntary organization cannot sue for breach of the internal constitution and regulations of the organization in the internal affairs of the organization”. In the case of AGI V. P.D.P (2017) 17 NWLR (PT. 1595)386 at 459, paras. E –F where RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C. held;
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the Guidelines and any other rules or regulations laid down by the party, the decision of the National Executive Committee as recommended by the National Working Committee shall be final and binding on all aspirants, officials and organs of the party with respect to eligibility or otherwise of aspirant.
The above makes it very clear that a party is supreme over its own affairs. See Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) p. 310; Onuoha v. Okafor &Ors (1983) 14 NSCC p. 494 (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; Uzodimma v. Izunaso (No. 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) p. 30; PDP v. Sylva (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1316) p. 85. A party is like a club. A voluntary association. It has its rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution. Members join the party on their own free will. By joining they have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules, regulations, guidelines and Constitution of the party”.
At page 474, Paras. D where RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C. “The party is therefore supreme and has the final say or decision. See PDP v. Sylva (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85. Every member of a political party, in order to remain in the party, must be loyal and be bound by the rules and regulations of his party and also must respect the party’s decision. A political party like a club; a voluntary association. It has its rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution. Members join the party of their free will. By joining they have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules, regulations, guidelines and constitution of the party. The rules of the party must be obeyed by all members of the party, as the party’s decision is final over its own affairs. When it comes to nomination of its candidate for election, the National Executive Committee of the party has the final say and whenever it approves or endorses a candidate to contest on the parties platform, he stands nominated and no other member can oppose that approval or nomination. The party is therefore supreme and has the final say or decision”.
At 459 – 460, paras. H – A where RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.
“Members of a party would do well to understand and appreciate the finality of a party’s decision over its domestic or internal affairs. The court would only interfere where the party has violated its own rules. Where the National Working Committee of the 1st respondent regards a person as a member of the party eligible to contest the primaries, no member of the party can complain against such a decision. Both courts were correct that the 3rd respondent is a member of the 1st respondent. such an issue is within the domestic and internal affairs of the 1st respondent over which the courts have no jurisdiction as such is not justiciable.
At 437, paras. G – H where OGUNBIYI, J.S.C. held;
Plethora of cases have shown where this court did quote with approval the decision in Musa v. PRP (supra), and held times without number that membership of a political party is a domestic affair of a party concerned. Therefore the court do not have jurisdiction to determine who the members of a Political Party are. See Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCLR 244; Lado v. C.P.C. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 689; PDP v. Sylva (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85 and Anyanwu v. Ogunenwe (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 437. The authorities are well pronounced and taken that an action based on the determination of membership of a party is not justiciable. Paragraph 48(f) has therefore carved out the status of membership which comes within the exclusive confines of internal affairs of a political party which are evidently non-justiciable. Similarly in ABDULKADIR V. MAMMAN (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 839)1 at 30, paras. A-C where ODUYEMI, J.C.A. held;
“The practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unicorporated associations) for members. The brief of 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents put the matter very succinctly at p. 11 of the brief when it states that the position of the law is that disputes which arise must be resolved by a majority decision of the members. This is the so called majority rule otherwise known as the rule in Foss. v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; the decision in which it was first articulated. Respondents also concede that the rule applies to all associations whether they be companies, clubs, trade unions or political parties – Hodgson v. National Local Government Officers Association (1972) 1 WLR 130. Respondents however made a distinction that to this rule which, with respect to political parties, is known as the “domestic affairs” rules there are at least two recognized exceptions and each of which exceptions it is contended applies to the circumstances of the case.”
At pages 31 – 33, paras A – F where ODUYEMI, J.C.A. held; The practice of the court is not to run associations (corporations and unicorporated associations) for members. I find that each of the complaints falls under one of the two questions on which the disputants join issue in the pleadings which I have already set out earlier. I have also set the complaints of the plaintiffs/respondents and the 10 reliefs claimed by them against the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Alliance for Democracy also earlier set out in this judgment; and that each and every one of the complaints and reliefs touch upon a matter on which there are internal arrangements within the constitution of the party for its resolution if plaintiffs had cared to employ the internal channels provided in the constitution of the party. It is the submission in the respondents brief under consideration that the several declarations and injunctions claimed by the respondents are directed towards the protection of the Constitution of the party and that the complaint of plaintiffs/respondents in this case is that the acts of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants/appellants are ultra vires the Constitution of the party. As could be seen from the extracts of the Constitution of the Alliance for Democracy earlier quoted in this judgment, that political party, like any other corporation, operates within the guidelines, the powers and duties set out in its constitution. All its members are bound by the provisions set out in the party’s constitution. Their respective rights and obligations created by their Constitution can be remedied, if breached by any of its members as provided for in that Constitution. The failure to have the plaintiffs appointed to any of the national offices in the national executive of the party cannot be said to be in breach of the Constitution or to be ultra vires of the powers of the Alliance for Democracy.
As stated by Lord Denning in Institute of Mechanical Engineers v. Cane (1961) A. C. 696 at 724- “There is a very real difference in law between these various societies. If you are considering a limited liability company … you know that the purpose of the company is determined exclusively by its Memorandum of Association. …So naturally enough, you look at the purpose for which the company was originally instituted. But when you are dealing with a voluntary association of individuals, the doctrine of ultra vires has no place….”. In the view of the law, a registered political party has the same capacity as a natural person. Unless its constitution or statute expressly prohibits it from doing an act, it has capacity to do such act.
Furthermore, looking through the statement of claim, I am unable to find any allegation of the infringement of any personal rights of the plaintiffs or any claim for damages therefore. It would be seen from the statement of claim of plaintiffs that the primary aim is to obtain an order of the court which would compel the members of Alliance for Democracy to elect plaintiffs as national officers of the party.
The court however, is not an appellate body set up by the party under its constitution to hear appeals from unsuccessful candidates in the exercise of nomination and running for elections into the national executive of the party. It has been held in Onuoha v. Okafor and Others (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, (1983) NSCC Vol. 14 p. 494 that the judicial powers of the courts now defined in S. 6 of the 1999 Constitution be construed to confer jurisdiction on the courts to run and manage political parties and politicians. See ibid at p. 501. In my humble opinion, the declarations sought for and the reliefs claimed in the statement of claim and in the originating summons of the plaintiffs invited the lower court to give answers to political questions. It is my humble view that the court in so doing would be deciding political questions which it is ill-fitted so to do. Onuoha v. Okafor and Others (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, (1983) 14 NSCC 494; Balonwu v. Chinyelu (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 183) p. 30. Bakam v. Abubakar (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) p. 564.
In the event, it is my respectful view that the lower court ought to have held that the subject of the complaints and claims in the originating summons of the plaintiffs/respondents, being on intra-party dispute on an internal affair of the Alliance for Democracy, a registered political party, concerned complaints on which it had no jurisdiction and it ought to have struck out the suit.I therefore hold that this appeal has merit. I allow it. I set aside the ruling of the lower court delivered on 3rd February, 2003. I strike out the substantive suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1415/2002.
At Page 33, paras. C – F, MUHAMMAD, J.C.A. held;
It is trite law that an intraparty governance is entirely within the province of the party. It is not the role of the court to make appointments of persons to hold party offices. The question of the candidate a political party will sponsor is more in the nature of a political question which the courts are not qualified to deliberate upon and answer”.
BULKACHUWA, J.C.A.:
“I agree with his conclusions that the internal affairs of political parties are exclusive to the parties and therefore not within the competence of the trial court – Alhaji Balarabe Musa v. Peoples Redemption Party (1981) 2 NCLR 763”
THE LOCUS STANDI OF ASPIRANTS TO APPROACH THE COURT
6.1 All aspirants have the power to approach the court for any perceived injury in the nomination process. Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) is very apt on the powers of aspirant to challenge the process. For the avoidance of doubt, the said section provided thus:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of a Political Party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guideline of a Political Party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a Political Party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a state or FCT, for redress. (Underlining is mine).
6.2 We submit that an “Aspirant” is define in Section 152 of the Electoral Act 2022 as “means a person who aspires or seeks or strives to contest an election to a political office. (Underlining is mine).
BINDINGNESS OF OATHS TO ABIDE BY OUTCOME OF NOMINATION
We submit that every aspirant has sworn affidavit that, he will not challenge the outcome of the Nomination or Primary election exercise or seek redress in the court of law. The affidavit was sworn to by every aspirant. In the said document titled affidavit of compliance, the appellant deposed thus,
“That I undertake to abide by the decision of the party as final (and not to subject it to any litigation whatsoever or adjudication by anybody including the court of law)”.
This similar issue played out in the case of PROFESSOR JERRY GANA, CON V. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) (2019) 11 NWLR (PT. 1684) 510. In that case, Professor Jerry Gana signed an undertaking as one of the Presidential Aspirants of SDP to support the winner of the election. He still went to Court and the Court held that as a man of honour, he must respect the undertaking. It is most pertinent to refer to the Judgment of Eko JSC at pages 536-537, paras H – E, held,
“I am in complete agreement with the 1st – 5th respondents that the appellant’s undertaking in exhibit SDP 5 is adverse to the case of the appellant. The undertaking clearly makes it not right or unconscionable for the appellant to litigate on the very cause of action he had elected, expressly, not to exercise his right of action to litigate, and had in fact emphatically represented to the electors and the other aspirants that he would “support whoever emerges as the winner of the position we are contesting for”. Equity acts in personam and particularly on the conscience of the party against whom it is pleaded who, allegedly, had acted in a manner very iniquitous, unconscionable or immoral by operation of the rule of estoppel. In the words of Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC in Ude v. Nwara (Supra) at page 662, a man is not allowed to blow hot and cold, to affirm at one time and to deny at the other, or, as it is said, to approbate and reprobate. Accordingly, on this principle and in view of his undertaking in exhibit SDP 5 the appellant, a man of honour is not allowed to mislead the 1st – 5th respondents into believing that he would support the winner of the contest between himself, on one hand, and the 5th respondent and other, on the other hand, and later turn around to litigate against them, particularly the 5th respondent who emerged as the winner of the contest”.
Kekere-Ekun JSC at page 545 in his concurring judgment stated, “It is also unfortunate that he failed to adhere to the written undertaking, freely given under his own hand, to support whoever emerged victorious from the exercise”. Galumje JSC at page 549 para F in his concurring judgment stated, “It is clearly unconscionable for him to turn around to complain after having undertaken to support however emerges the winner of the primary election”. 7.3 In the recent case of Ndukwe v. UBN PLC (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt.1765) 165 at 203 para B. Eko JSC stated, “Undertaking or agreement are meant to be honoured”. 7.4 Finally, in MEKWUNYE v. W.A.E.C (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1719) 1, the Supreme Court speaking through Galinje JSC held,
“ In Akanni v. Makanju (1978) 11 SC 13 at 26 and Okonkwo v Koajie (1992) LPELR – 2438 (SC) that, where a man by word or conduct willfully made a representation of a state of facts to another, and thereby induced that other person to believe that the state of things were as represented by that person, and that other took him by his words and acted upon that representation, then that person who made the representation either by himself or his representative in interest, cannot now turn around to say or behave as if the state of things were not as he represented then. He is stopped from asserting the contrary”
7.5 The politics is a systemic game. An outsider hardly succeeds. Those that fail go all out to use the court to get justice but the court sometimes thinks that politicians should accept defeat. In Donald v. Saleh (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1444) 529, OGBUINYA, J.C.A. at page 576, Para. E-F held,
“Indeed, the earlier the unpatriotic practitioners of our fledgling democracy accept defeat at the polls, the better for its stability. Election litigation is unfriendly to the contesting parties. It consumes the meager time the loser has to prepare for the next election as well as distracts the winner from ministering to the needs of his electoral constituents. In the end, the innocent electorate bears the brunt of the unending election litigation.”
CONCLUSION
Finally, the issue of candidature of a political party is purely an internal and domestic affairs of the party. You cannot force or impose a candidate on the party but a party can however, impose a candidate on the members. This is the law.
Ekom Nwoko, The Head of Administration and Research Nwoko & Co. Plot 104 Nsikak Eduok Avenue, (2 Lane), Uyo, Akwa Ibom State
